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This paper investigates the consequences of activist monetary policy in a small, aggregate 
macroeconomic model which embodies traditional hypotheses of price and output de- 
termination. It is shown that deterministic control problems with inflation and full 
employment as objectives may be solved. but multiple-target stochastic control problems 
will lead to instability in both the targets and the policy instrument. 
1. Introduction and summary 
The use of conventional macroeconomic models to analyze the effects 
of monetary and fiscal policies has been the subject of considerable 
discussion and controversy in recent years. The strong forms of the 
rational expectations and natural rate hypotheses suggest that there is 
limited scope for active stabilization policies and perhaps, also, for the 
use of traditional macroeconometric models. These challenges are typi- 
cally countered with the argument that the empirical evidence, as inter- 
preted by Gordon (1979) Nelson (1981), Makin (1981) and Mishkin 
(1982), for example, is not sufficiently compelling to justify abandonment 
of the orthodox approach to macroeconomic policy analysis. 
* This paper is derived from Baum and Howrey (1981). We appreciate the comments of 
several of the SEDC Conference participants, as well as those of Saul Hymans, Art 
Rolnick, Jim Anderson and Bruce Smith. The usual caveat applies. 
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The purpose of this note is to point out a potential difficulty with the 
conduct of activist stabilization policy within the context of a traditional 
macroeconomic model. In a model with conventional price and output 
adjustment equations, we find that in the absence of stochastic dis- 
turbances there need not be any difficulty in pursuing active stabilization 
policy to achieve both full employment and price stability. However. 
when stochastic disturbances are introduced into this congenial environ- 
ment, optimal control of inflation and unemployment inevitably leads to 
stochastic instability of both targets and instruments. Thus. even in a 
traditional macro framework, the tradeoff between inflation and unem- 
ployment may not be exploitable on a continuing basis in a world of 
recurrent price and output shocks. 
2. The model 
The model we analyze is a condensed version of the model in Baum 
and Howrey (1981). Its basic elements include an aggregate demand 
curve, an aggregate output equation and a price adjustment equation. 
These three equations are written in log-linear form as 
Y=cY,+a(M-P), 
Q=Q-,+P(Y-Q-,)3 




where Y is the logarithm of real aggregate demand, A4 is the logarithm of 
the stock of money, P is the logarithm of the price level, Q is the 
logarithm of real output, and Q* is the logarithm of potential output. 
The aggregate demand equation can be viewed as a standard reduced 
form equation obtained from the IS-LM framework in which real 
aggregate demand depends on (among other things) real money balances. 
The output equation is a partial adjustment equation in the production 
smoothing tradition in which production is assumed to respond to excess 
aggregate demand, (Y - Q_ ,). Finally, a standard Phillips curve is used 
to relate the price level to the gap between potential and actual output, 
similar to that studied by Frye and Gordon (1980). 
In order to simplify the development of the basic result, we suppose 
that p = 1, combine eqs. (1) and (2) via the equilibrium condition Y = Q. 
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and append stochastic disturbance terms to the equations to obtain 
Q=a,++-P)+U& (4) 
P=YR+ Up, (5) 
where p = AP is the rate of price inflation and R = (Q - Q*) is the gap 
between actual and potential output. These two variables correspond to 
the targets of price stability and full employment. To analyze their 
behavior, we derive the fundamental dynamic equations [Kmenta (197 1, 
p. 591)] for R and p: 
(1 -hL)R=cYXm-Xq*+MUQ-ffXU,, (6) 
(1 -XL)p=cYyXm-yXq*+yMU,+MU,, (7) 
where m = AM, q* = AQ*, X = l/(1 + (my), and L is the lag operator. 
It is readily apparent from these equations that, in the absence of 
output and price disturbances, setting m = a- ‘q* yields an equilibrium 
with full employment (R = 0) and a constant price level ( p = 0) which is 
dynamically stable, since 0 < h < 1 provided that (Y > 0 and y > 0. Devia- 
tions from this equilibrium resulting from price and output disturbances 
will be stable, in the sense of possessing a finite variance, if the dis- 
turbance processes {U,} and (U,) have finite variances. A common 
assumption, consistent with a broad range of empirical findings, is that 
{AU,} and {AU,} are serially independent. In this case, the rate of 
inflation is stochastically stable, but the gap is stochastically unstable 
since (U,} follows a random walk. We now suppose that q*, a, and y are 
known, and consider the certainty equivalent control problem for this 
model. 
3. Activist stabilization policy 
If m is set each period to minimize 
C= E[ K,p2 + K2R2] (8) 
the following system, including the endogenous policy, is obtained: 
R=a,,R_, +m,,P_, + W,, (9) 
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(10) 
m = xj,R_, + 773r,,p_, + “-‘q* + w,,. (11) 
The parameters and disturbances in this system are defined by 
?r,, = A(1 -SK,), 
77 12 = -ysXK,, 
7721 = - Y~XK,, 
77 3, = -a - ‘6K,, 
W,=yhV,+h(l-(l-y2SK,)L)UP-yY8X(yK,-aKZ)fi,>, 
W,,= -cu-‘Uy--(cr-‘yK,-K,)cb+a~‘LU~+cu~’ySK,LU,, 
where 6 = (y2K, + K,)- ‘, (i,(a,) is the expected value of U,(U,) at the 
beginning of the decision period, VP is the unanticipated part of Uo, and 
L is the lag operator. 
It will be noted that W,, WP, and W,, will contain UP, aP or both 
whenever both K, and K, are non-zero. It follows that if U,, follows a 
random walk, as empirical research suggests, any attempt to control both 
inflation and unemployment - irregardless of relative weights in the loss 
function - leads to stochastic instability of both the targets and the 
instrument. 
Two special cases of interest are obtained by placing only one target in 
the loss function. With K, = 1, K, = 0, inflation is the only target, and 
the controlled system takes the form 
m = yhq * -xp_, - yx(i& LUQ) -A(& LUp), (12) 
p=yxvp+xvp, (13) 
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where VP is the unanticipated part of UP. If Ua and UP follow random 
walks, then i!& = LUQ; fip = LU,; both m and p are stochastically stable, 
but R is stochastically unstable, because it depends upon U,,. 
If the monetary instrument is set to maintain full employment, K, = 0, 
K, = 1, and the controlled system becomes 
m=a-‘q*+a-‘(l -X&-(1 -X)V,-,-‘A(/,+ Up, (15) 
p=yxvQ-“yxv~+ u,, (16) 
R = XVQ - &VP. (17) 
In this case, R differs from zero in any period by a serially uncorrelated 
random disturbance. Both m and p are stochastically unstable if Up 
follows a random walk. 
The results of this analysis may be summarized as follows. With price 
level disturbances following a random walk, if p is controlled, R will be 
unstable; if R is controlled, p will be unstable; if both p and R are 
controlled, both will be unstable. Moreover, control of R alone or control 
of p and R together leads to stochastic instability of the instrument. In 
such a world, it would not be surprising if the monetary authority 
exhibited schizophrenic behavior! 
One might conjecture that this pervasive instability is due to the 
absence of a weight on the instrument, m. The objective function (8) may 
be expanded to include a weight K, on (m - m*)*, the deviation of 
money from its desired path. Alternatively, a derivative stabilization of m 
could be implemented with the term K3( m - m _ ‘)*. In either case, it may 
be shown that the qualitative result remains: any set of non-zero weights 
[K,, K,, K,] will produce an unstable system. The use of proportional 
control of the instrument will introduce monotonic terms in the char- 
acteristic equation, whereas the derivative control of m may potentially 
introduce oscillatory behavior. In the end, all such systems are qualita- 
tively identical to the system described above. 
This strong instability result limiting the scope for multitarget activist 
policy is the result of our assumptions regarding the disturbance process: 
namely, that Up is a random walk. If this strong assumption is modified 
to 
(1 -PL)u,= VP> 
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where p is slightly less than unity, the extreme result disappears. The 
infinite variances will now be finite, but perhaps still unacceptably large. 
Activist policy may in this case be technically feasible, but may have little 
to offer the architect of stabilization policy. 
4. Conclusions 
The characteristics of activist policy in the context of a small, tradi- 
tional macroeconomic model were examined. We found that substantial 
improvement in the inflation rate or the employment rate could be 
achieved through monetary control, even in the presence of unstable 
price level shocks. However, if monetary policy is designed to maintain 
full employment without inflation, unstable price shocks lead to chaos. 
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